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ABSTRACT
This article presents a new analytical framework for studying cities in the
developing world based on the ‘political settlements’ approach. This has a
dual purpose: to enrich comparative urban research by bringing new the-
oretical ideas to bear on this field, but also to use capital cities as a lens
to better understand national political settlements. The central argument is
that urban built environments and their transformations in situations of late
development reflect the workings of different varieties of clientelism, and
by analysing the former we can better understand the latter. Specifically,
issues such as the nature of urban land use and land allocation, the pace and
form of construction, the effectiveness of environmental regulation and the
provision of housing for different income groups are all revealing of political
settlements and their broader development implications. The potential of this
approach is explored through three narrative ‘sketches’ of contemporary ur-
ban development in Eastern Africa: the ‘city as marketplace’ (Kampala), the
‘city as expo’ (Kigali) and the ‘city as construction site’ (Addis Ababa). In
presenting this framework, the article seeks to advance debate on epistemo-
logical and analytical approaches to the study of both power relations and
differential patterns of urban development.
INTRODUCTION
This article proposes a new analytical approach to comparative urban de-
velopment research, building both on the renaissance in comparative urban
thinking and growing interest in ‘political settlement’ analysis in develop-
ment studies and political economy. It argues that the political settlements
approach — which despite its growing influence has devoted little attention
thus far to space, scale and subnational governance — holds potential to
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illuminate how varying relationships between political power and institu-
tional structure shape cities across the global South. In so doing, it aims to
bring new interdisciplinary perspectives to bear on the field of comparative
urbanism, and to enrich the political settlements approach itself. Urban politi-
cal science has been slow to embrace comparison (Kantor and Savitch, 2005;
Pierre, 2005), especially beyond the confines of high-income countries. This
is despite the flourishing of comparative urban work within geography, but
also despite the proliferation of comparative national-level approaches to
the political economy of development, including political settlement ana-
lysis. Bringing together these trends, this article advances an interpretation
of political settlement analysis that aims to generate new insights into the
drivers of diverse urban transformations occurring across the developing
world.
In recent years, scholars such as Ward (2008), McFarlane (2010) and
Robinson (2011, 2016) have highlighted a resurgence of interest in compar-
ative urbanism with particular attention to developing countries, drawing on
post-colonial theory and the literature on policy mobilities (McCann, 2011).
This work, which I refer to as the ‘new comparative urbanism’, emphasizes
that all cities are starting points for theory building, eschewing ideas of
‘paradigmatic urbanism’ and rejecting the notion that everything should be
measured against how things work in US or European cities (McFarlane,
2010; Robinson, 2006, 2011). This marks an exciting turn in urban schol-
arship, exploding conventional global North/South divides and promoting
‘new geographies of theory’ (Roy, 2009). Its greatest contribution thus far
has been conceptualizing comparison in new ways; although empirical com-
parisons inspired by this work are now growing in number, for the most part
comparative empirical analyses of specific cities have so far been limited,
with the comparative element often remaining implicit. For example, of the
30 articles included in a 2014 Virtual Issue of the International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research on ‘comparative urbanism’, few explicitly
compare specific cities, and only three involve direct comparisons where
one or more of the cities is outside the global North.1 There is thus still rel-
atively little by way of research on cities in developing countries predicated
on systematic comparison.
Comparative research is also thriving in the study of the political economy
of development, providing further opportunity for interdisciplinary cross-
fertilization of urban research — if we are prepared to overcome scalar
conventions. Indeed, Tilly’s (1984) exhortation to understand the inter-
actions of political processes at different scales is as important as ever. Sep-
arating the city from other scales can obscure the importance of ‘national
infrastructures’ for urban analysis (Sellers, 2005) — especially in parts of
the global South where the autonomy of municipal governments and mayors
1. This Virtual Issue was edited by Jennifer Robinson; see: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/1468-2427.12171/full
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tends to be much more constrained than in the Northern contexts that gave
rise to most existing urban theory (Resnick, 2014). Thus while Robinson
(2006) rightly argues that we should not allow urban studies to be colonized
by ideas of ‘cityness’ from the global North, we should equally not allow
urban studies to become too insular, depending only on ideas developed at
the city level. This is particularly true of capital cities, where national and
municipal ‘infrastructures’ of governance are often intertwined — and it is
capital cities that are the primary focus of this article.
The political settlements approach, associated particularly with the work
of Mushtaq Khan (1995, 2010) and explicated in more detail below, of-
fers one way forward. This approach focuses on the tripartite relationship
between formal institutions, informal institutions and the distribution of
power in a given setting, and how economic structure underpins this re-
lationship in contexts of late capitalist transition (Gray, 2016). It offers
complementarities with existing urban theory while also holding the po-
tential to advance understanding of different formal–informal institutional
configurations in cities of the global South. While extant urban scholarship
offers many insights into institutional and power structures, when it comes
to cities of the developing world there is a risk that generic treatments of
informality and clientelism homogenize the ‘view from the South’. Sig-
nificant differences in the way contemporary cities are evolving suggest
that despite the insistent, neoliberal march of globalization, nothing is in-
evitable about 21st century urban development in the South. Such variation
demands exploration. What the political settlements framework offers ur-
ban analysis is therefore a way to comparatively analyse the many varieties
of clientelism and formal–informal interface in developing countries, and
their concrete manifestations in situations of rapid urban growth and trans-
formation. Meanwhile, an urban focus also offers something to the political
settlements approach: a fruitful new empirical domain. For example, through
studying changes to (and bargaining over) land use and the built environ-
ment, we can learn a great deal about the underpinning political-institutional
situation.
Within a broader potential research agenda for the application of politi-
cal settlements analysis to cities (outlined in the conclusion), this article is
primarily concerned with explaining striking differences in cities’ evolving
built environment through a political settlements lens. In the first section,
the article outlines the main tenets of the political settlements framework.
This is followed by an exposition of how it can be applied to the evolving
physical form of cities, and how the approach relates to some other relevant
bodies of urban theory. Following this, the analytical potential of the ap-
proach is briefly explored through three short narratives of rapidly growing
cities in Eastern Africa: the ‘city as marketplace’ (Kampala), the ‘city as
expo’ (Kigali) and the ‘city as construction site’ (Addis Ababa). Finally, a
conclusion offers some tentative thoughts on how a broader research agenda
might be taken forward.
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THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS APPROACH TO THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT
The political settlements framework developed by Khan (1995, 2010) is
rapidly gaining traction in debates on the political economy of development
(Di John and Putzel, 2009; Gray, 2015, 2016; Sen, 2013; Whitfield et al.,
2015). The approach was developed in explicit contradistinction to the ‘new
institutional economics’ (NIE) associated with scholars such as North (1990)
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), which continues to characterize the
mainstream accounts of economic transformation in the developing world.
Central to the critique is the failure of NIE to engage fully with informal
institutions and how these relate to formal ones (such as legally enshrined
property rights), as well as how the specific nature of late capitalism shapes
the power relations that underpin institutional arrangements.
Taking a lead from the NIE they critique, institutions are defined in this
approach as ‘the rules and norms that govern behaviour’ (Di John and Putzel,
2009: 6). Yet unlike authors such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) whose
treatment of power is largely decontextualized from economic structure,
the political settlements approach is rooted in historical materialism. It thus
draws our attention to the fact that formal institutions characteristic of devel-
oped democratic capitalism — for example the rule of law, secure property
rights and transparent judicial processes — are a reflection of the evolution
of capitalist societies. They exist to support capitalism, and ‘work’ in such
societies because they reflect a power structure shaped to a significant degree
by capitalist profits (Gray, 2016). Khan argues that in developing countries,
although formal capitalist institutions are usually in place (often promoted
by donors), the productive sector and capitalist foundations of the state are
much weaker. Many powerful groups instead draw their power from sources
such as control over land, coercive capabilities or traditional authority, and
cannot maintain this power through formal capitalist rules and rights. This
leads to a structural ‘mismatch between the scale and productivity of activ-
ities protected by formal institutions and the distribution of power’ (Khan,
2010: 30). In other words, formal institutions in most developing countries
often do not serve the interests of the powerful very well. In such situ-
ations, informal institutions play a critical role in promoting political stabil-
ity by addressing this mismatch and ensuring that benefits accrue to powerful
groups who would otherwise mobilize to (violently) contest the institutional
structure (Gray and Whitfield, 2014).
This focus on how context-specific power relations aremaintained through
particular configurations of formal and informal institutions is one of the
distinctive contributions of the political settlements approach. For Khan, a
political settlement involves ‘an institutional structure that creates benefits
for different classes and groups in line with their relative power’ (Khan
2010: 20). Any situation in which there is not large-scale conflict (which
would indicate the breakdown of a pre-existing political settlement) reflects
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a political settlement of some kind; yet these vary in relation to a number of
factors. One is the degree to which formal relative to informal institutions
do the ‘work’ of maintaining stability by allocating benefits to the powerful.
Rather than the material foundations of power distribution, it is this focus
on the balance of informal versus formal institutions to allocate benefits that
this article explores through the lens of capital cities.
If formal institutions refer to laws, regulatory frameworks and govern-
ment policies, informal institutions are rules that are ‘systematic enough to
be identified’, but not officially written down or implemented by the state
(Khan, 2010: 10). Informal institutions, particularly in the form of clien-
telistic relations through which economic rents are exchanged for political
support, tend to be viewed in NIE as a hindrance to development. For polit-
ical settlement theorists, however, such institutions are critical for ensuring
the political stability on which sustained economic development is predi-
cated. In his more recent collaborative work, North has acknowledged the
importance of informal clientelistic institutions for generating stability in this
way (North et al., 2009). However, the ‘access order’ framework developed
by North and his colleagues fails to acknowledge how structural economic
conditions produce historically contingent power relations, which in turn
give rise to different configurations of formal and informal institutions in
situations of late development (Gray, 2016).
Informal institutions exist in developed capitalist economies too, but here
it is the formal ones — which have evolved over time to reflect the profit-
making interests of capitalists — that do the primary work of maintaining
the political settlement. By contrast, in most developing countries, even if
the same formal institutions are in place, they are frequently subverted by
clientelist informal institutions that serve better to allocate benefits to the
powerful. This does not mean formal institutions are irrelevant, because
they still play a role in shaping the broader institutional environment: in-
deed informal institutions often comprise ‘adaptations to the ways in which
particular formal institutions work’ (Khan, 2010: 1).
Khan’s overarching four-way typology of political settlements involves
two varieties in which formal institutions are well aligned with existing
power relations: capitalist political settlements (which broadly include most
developed economies) and pre-capitalist political settlements (encompass-
ing various forms of feudalism). Then there are two varieties of political
settlement in which formal institutions are poorly aligned with significant
elements in the distribution of power: ‘clientelist’ political settlements (in
which formal capitalist productive rights exist but are not well enforced, and
powerful groups can influence outcomes regardless of formal rights) and
‘political settlements in crisis’. The latter refers to situations where formal
institutions have virtually collapsed and the settlement is being violently con-
tested, while the former encapsulates a wide range of developing countries
not in large-scale conflict. The category of clientelist political settlements
is thus extremely broad, and can be broken down further by exploring how
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particular institutional configurations are supported by a context-specific
balance of power.
In the political settlements framework a distinction is commonly made
between the ruling elite — the top political leaders in an incumbent regime
—and the ruling coalition—the factions that broadly support this ruling elite
(Kjær, 2015). Differences in the distribution of power are conceptualized
by Khan (2010: 64) both horizontally (the relative strength of elite factions
outside the ruling coalition) and vertically (the relative strength of factions
at lower levels within the ruling coalition). To this, Whitfield et al. (2015:
98) have added a focus on the degree of cohesion within the ruling elite.
Khan subdivides the coalitions underpinning clientelistic political settle-
ments again into four types, which reflect the differential capacity of factions
to command resources ‘off-budget’ in the form of patronage and clientelis-
tic favours. The categories (discussed at length in Khan, 2010: 64–69) are
‘potential developmental’, ‘(vulnerable) authoritarian’, ‘(weak) dominant
party’ and ‘competitive clientelist’. Khan also further categorizes clientelis-
tic political settlements in terms of the power and capabilities of emerg-
ing productive entrepreneurs relative to other social groups (ibid.: 69–75).
The power distribution among political factions, combined with the relative
power of productive entrepreneurs in a given setting, is central to Khan’s
explanation of differential economic growth outcomes.
As Khan acknowledges, the dimensions of clientelistic political settle-
ments outlined above ‘by no means exhaust the different aspects of the
distribution of power that can affect institutional performance’ (ibid.: 75).
The intention here is not to rigidly apply these categorizations at the level
of the city, but to explore the potential for using the broader framework
to understand the relationship between power distribution and urban out-
comes other than economic growth. What the framework facilitates is an
exploration of the institutional basis for different varieties of clientelism —
paralleling in some respects the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature focused
on the global North (see Hall and Soskice, 2001). Before exploring how
urban analysis and the political settlements framework intersect, however,
we need to consider further the concept of power which is so central to the
framework.
Conceptualizing, observing and measuring power is notoriously difficult.
Proponents of the political settlements approach use Khan’s concept of
relative ‘holding power’, which has been conceptualized as the ability of
individuals and groups to assert or maintain claims to the ownership of
property and income flows (Gray andWhitfield, 2014: 11). ‘Holding power’
is therefore a specific conception of power that links it to the capacity to
acquire and maintain material benefits.2 This relative holding power can be
exercised through ‘violence or the threat of violence, ideas, sociological and
2. Note here that ‘holding power’ is a compound noun, rather than a verb followed by a noun;
i.e. an individual or group has ‘relative holding power’, rather than is holding power.
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institutional hierarchies and traditional authority as well as through access
to economic resources’ (ibid.).
Significant holding power in developing countries can be based on organi-
zational capabilities, for instance of ‘intermediate class’ elites who organize
clients and use them in political confrontations (Khan, 2010: 54). Sources of
holding power are inevitably context-specific and determined by historical
patterns of conflict and organization, and are often very difficult to observe.
However, utilizing a political settlements approach does not require an as-
sessment of the sources of power ex ante, but rather an understanding of
some of the outcomes of the distribution of power and the formal–informal
institutional configuration through which these are realized. Knight’s (1992)
point that in any society it is unlikely that the overall institutional structure
can produce a distribution of benefits significantly out of line with the dis-
tribution of power is central to the political settlements approach, and to op-
erationalizing any analysis based on it. Following this logic, we can broadly
‘read’ the distribution of power by identifying the de facto beneficiaries
of institutional arrangements.3 Building on this, the present article is con-
cerned specifically with benefits that manifest in the form of urban land and
property, and concomitantly how we can ‘read’ urban form to better under-
stand the relative power of different groups and how this is institutionally
organized. It is to this urban application of the approach that we now turn.
POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS AND URBAN ANALYSIS
Cities constitute institutionally dense and complex environments. Multi-
ple layers of government regulation shape urban life, yet these frequently
operate alongside a range of ‘twilight’ economic and political institutions
(Lund, 2006). There is already a rich literature on how engrained and more
ephemeral informal institutions affect urban life in cities of the develop-
ing world, including with respect to land (see, for example, Bayat, 2007;
Rakodi, 2006; Roy, 2011; Simone, 2004; Waibel and McFarlane, 2012;
Watson, 2009). Pervasive informality means that many city dwellers’ homes
3. This perspective is subject to important criticisms. First, the distribution of benefits may
not always map neatly onto the distribution of power, broadly conceived. This is one of
the reasons for using a narrower concept of ‘holding power’, which relates specifically
to the degree to which groups can acquire and maintain benefits, enabling a focus on
the institutional channels through which this link between power and benefits is realized
in different contexts. The capacity of different groups to acquire benefits can also shift
over time, both gradually and in more sudden ways. Moreover, not all benefits that accrue
to the powerful are visible; like sources of power, outcomes can be difficult to observe.
Despite these problems, given that power is largely absent in dominant ‘new institutional’
approaches, a framework that gets us closer to being able to identify power through a focus
on associated outcomes and how they are institutionally distributed is worthy of further
exploration.
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and livelihoods exist in ‘gray spaces’ that contravene formal institutions but
are not clearly illegal either, resulting in a precarious state of permanent
vulnerability (Yiftachel, 2009).
Some of this literature is also explicitly comparative; even before the ‘new
comparative urbanism’ gained momentum, Rakodi’s (2006) Special Issue
was a notable example of comparative work on formal and informal mech-
anisms of urban land delivery. However, coming primarily from an urban
planning perspective, such work pays little attention to national political
dynamics and how struggles for resources among social groups play into
formal–informal institutional dynamics in different urban contexts. Urban
land and real estate are highly prized, and thus constitute key instruments of
benefit allocation for maintaining political coalitions. By applying a politi-
cal settlements lens to cities, we can explore further how built environments
reflect what Simone (2004) calls a ‘functional tandem’ between different
institutional forms which, by allowing benefits to flow to particular groups,
remains stable as well as being fluid.
All three components of the basic political settlements framework — for-
mal institutions, informal institutions and distributions of holding power —
have particular applications when considered in relation to urban built envir-
onments. Relevant formal institutions include national-level legislation on
property rights and land tenure, as well as decentralized laws and municipal
regulations concerning building control, land use and taxation. Urban master
plans and zoning rules also constitute formal institutions, as do government
tendering procedures and investment incentives. For the remainder of this
article, the term ‘formal institutions’ is used as a shorthand for all these legal
and regulatory instruments and planning frameworks. On the informal side,
along with ‘traditional’ forms of land delivery that are not endorsed by the
state, there are clientelistic norms, including the waiving of official rules or
systematic non-enforcement of tax payment in exchange for political sup-
port, or the regularized use of bribes for access to government contracts or
permission to use urban land in prohibited ways.
This leaves the question of the distribution of holding power, as reflected in
a particular distribution of benefits. The specific benefits we are interested in
here concern access to urban land, and rights to use and acquire income from
land and the built environment. Many of the physical transformations that
occur in cities are concrete manifestations of the allocation of such benefits,
through which we can learn more about prevailing power structures. In
capital cities especially, particularly where these are also economically core,
nationally significant groups tend to make demands for benefits rooted in the
urban terrain, which they are successful in realizing if they have sufficient
holding power. Indeed, as Whitfield et al. (2015: 95) note, ‘land is still the
dominant mode of accumulation in African countries’, and urban land in
core cities is particularly lucrative, especially when used in highly intensive
ways. The physicality of cities thus provides a window — albeit not a fully
transparent one — onto how and to whom material benefits are accruing.
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Benefits relating to land and the built environment may not be entirely
visible, but they are more visible than many other types of benefits such as
more obscure financial assets. This empirical focus therefore constitutes an
epistemological lens onto ‘holding power’.
To operationalize this framework implies gathering data on physical urban
transformations such as major construction projects, expropriations, real es-
tate and housing ventures, including with respect to how these are financed
and who the beneficiaries are. We can then examine the degree to which
such developments are taking place in accordance with the formal rules, in
direct contravention of them but supported by recognizable informal norms,
or in ‘gray spaces’ where formal institutions are unclear. This helps to map
the contours of the national political settlement in a particular urban con-
text, elucidating who benefits from existing institutions relating to the built
environment, and whether these benefits are primarily allocated formally or
informally. Analysing how the distribution of material benefits to support
this power structure is organized through a particular configuration, formal
and informal institutions help to explain social, environmental and land use
outcomes that matter significantly for human well-being.
This approach shares elements with existing perspectives in urban studies
across different disciplines, but is tailored to explaining the significant differ-
ences in formal–informal institutional interface in cities of the developing
world and how they affect cities’ physical evolution. Like contemporary
Marxist urban scholars such as Peck, Theodore and Brenner, it is concerned
with how global political economy in a marketized world ‘touches down’ in
differentiated (and path dependent) ways in different urban contexts (Peck
et al., 2009). Unlike these approaches, however, it calls attention to the par-
tial and highly circumscribed capitalist development that characterizes many
cities in developing countries (Parnell and Robinson, 2012), and the conse-
quent importance of informal institutions. The political settlements approach
also offers some complementarities with more agency-centred sociological
theories of urban change, including Molotch’s (1976, 1993) ‘urban growth
machine’. The role of ‘competing land-interest groups’ (Molotch, 1976: 311)
and urban ‘growth entrepreneurs’ (Molotch, 1993: 32) in pushing for their
interests is clearly important in the global South today. However, there is
relatively little research on how this plays out in situations where the nascent
property development industry is relatively uninstitutionalized.
The political settlements approach also offers some parallels with im-
portant strands of Urban Political Science — particularly Urban Regime
Theory (URT). Like Khan, Stone is concerned with the ‘informal arrange-
ments by which public bodies and private interests function together’ in
order to make and implement governing decisions (Stone, 1989: 6). Urban
regime analysis also emphasizes the ‘iron law’ that to be effective at gov-
erning, a coalition must have the capacity to make ‘side payments’ to
groups negatively affected by particular developments (Stone, 2005: 317).
While using different terminology, this corresponds with the attention in the
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political settlements framework to the distribution of ‘informal incomes like
off-budget resources, land, and other types of rents that are created through
the exercise of informal political power’ (Khan, 2010: 54). In the context
of urban planning and land development, such informally allocated ‘side
payments’ include preferential access to land, the waiving of land use and
construction regulations, and non-enforcement of local taxation.
Despite these important complementarities, URT rests on a clear divide
between ‘main street’ and ‘city hall’ as two poles of power that must find
ways to collaborate (Stone, 2005: 326). In many less-developed countries,
this assumed division barely exists to begin with; a post-colonial fusion of
power challenges conventional thinking on public/private divides (Gray and
Whitfield, 2014;Migdal, 1988).While URT performed a crucial role inmov-
ing urban political science beyond the elitism-pluralism debate (Mossberger
and Stoker, 2001), its assumptions about particular forms of developed cap-
italism do not travel very well beyond the US and some European contexts
(ibid.). It has also been criticized for its excessively ‘localist’ focus (Ward,
1996), assuming that city politics can be somehow ‘sealed off’ from broader
national and global processes (Lauria, 1997: 75). This is a particularly per-
tinent criticism in relation to the global South (beyond a limited number
of cases mostly in Latin America), given the prevalence of central gov-
ernment interference and the blurring of boundaries between national and
urban institutions (Goodfellow, 2015; Resnick, 2014). In these respects the
valuable attention to coalition formation, informality and ‘side payments’
in URT could usefully be supplemented by the political settlements frame-
work. Specifically, the attention of the latter to national power dynamics and
the variable institutional forms of clientelism is necessary for understanding
urban outcomes in situations of late capitalist transition.
These considerations bring us back to the ‘new comparative urbanism’,
and its call for theory generation predicated on existing conditions in the
global South. The approach proposed here benefits from the above trends in
urban analysis, but also from the literature on clientelism and the formal–
informal institutional interface in cities of the global South (Roy, 2011;
Waibel and McFarlane, 2012; Watson, 2009). By exploring national po-
litical settlements at the city level, this article complements and extends
some of these approaches by systematically comparing varieties of clien-
telism and analysing the physical manifestation of different formal–informal
institutional configurations.
The following sections further elaborate the approach through three
‘sketches’ from Eastern Africa. The primary material is drawn from semi-
structured interviews with government officials, politicians, property own-
ers, community members and architects during research on urban planning,
land and other property-related issues in the three countries over a six-year
period from 2009 to 2015. A range of literature on the recent evolution of
the three cities is also consulted, as well as relevant policy documentation.
Building on this empirical base, what follows constitutes an exploration of
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how the political settlements framework might be used to analyse signif-
icant divergences in the built evolution of three cities. The narratives are
necessarily brief and heuristic, intended to indicate the framework’s value
for generating comparative insights and to spur further systematic research
along these lines. Greater detail on each has been sacrificed for the breadth
of a discussion encompassing three distinct cases, to challenge the common
tendency to collapse difference into binary opposition, and thereby better
explore the complex variety of clientelist political settlements. In each case,
I outline key characteristics of the national political settlement before ex-
ploring how the urban built environment can enhance our understanding of
the deeper workings and institutional organization of this settlement.
KAMPALA: THE CITY-AS-MARKETPLACE
The political settlement in Uganda has to accommodate a relatively diffuse
distribution of power. While some of the main productive entrepreneurs
in the economy consist of Asian business people formerly expelled by Idi
Amin and invited back by President Museveni in the 1990s, these are rela-
tively small in number and generally not considered politically threatening
due to their broad support of the National Resistance Movement (NRM)
regime (Rubongoya, 2007). Much more significant numerically and politi-
cally are various factions excluded ‘horizontally’ from the ruling coalition
who have relatively low entrepreneurial capabilities and thus do not benefit
significantly from Uganda’s (colonial and donor-driven) formal institutional
framework of capitalist property rights, yet by virtue of their relative holding
power, command benefits through informal channels. These include elites
from traditional authorities whose support was crucial to NRM success in the
civil war but who increasingly feel excluded, and ethnic groups that formerly
dominated government and are associated with the capacity to mobilize
violence (Kjær, 2015; Lindemann, 2011). In addition, some ‘lower-level’
factions (including former soldiers and highly politicized informal economic
groups) possess a degree of holding power due to their numerical signifi-
cance as a voting bloc, evidenced by their capacity to subvert government
regulations in their interests (Goodfellow and Titeca, 2012). Uganda’s long
history of rebellion and complex ethnic mix render any governing coalition
fundamentally fragile in this regard (Tripp, 2010). The strategy of the rul-
ing NRM, in power since 1986, consequently involves ‘side payments’ to a
relatively large number of important factions in order to hold together the
ruling coalition (Kjær, 2015: 232).4
In the capital city, the NRM ruling elite has to accommodate older es-
tablished interests such as leading figures in the Buganda Kingdom, within
4. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the political settlement in Uganda, seeWhitfield
et al. (2015: 161–76).
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which the city is geographically located (Gore and Muwanga, 2014). More-
over, the economy rapidly informalized in the 1970s under Idi Amin and
the subsequent regime of Milton Obote (Kasfir, 1983), and although a small
returnee Asian capitalist class exists, the majority of the urban workforce
is employed in the informal economy — around 70 per cent in 2010 (ILO,
2013). In the context of a low (and declining) capacity for the regime to
effect structural economic transformation (Kjær, 2015), the need for con-
tinued patronage renders investing in productive capitalist enterprise even
less appealing to the elite because the payoffs are uncertain and may take a
long time to materialize (Tripp, 2010). The recourse to informal side pay-
ments linked to land use and distribution thus became highly significant
over successive decades under the NRM. Against this backdrop, Kampala’s
physical evolution, particularly in the period 2000–10,5 can be understood
as reflecting the dominance of informal institutions which directly subverted
formal rules in the process of allocating benefits to individuals and groups
with relatively substantial holding power.
Exacerbating existing trends from previous decades, this period was
characterized by the degradation of infrastructure, encroachment of illegal
construction onto environmental resources and informalization of wealthy
neighbourhoods (Goodfellow, 2013; Gore and Muwanga, 2014). This oc-
curred alongside the virtual abandonment of existing plans and regulatory
frameworks. The transformation of the urban landscape over this period is
aptly illustrated by the mushrooming of high-end hotels that contravened ba-
sic regulations, the virtual eradication of the city’s green spaces (apart from
the golf course) and the large number of informal marketplaces occupy-
ing land throughout the city (Goodfellow, 2013; Lindell and Appelblad,
2009). In some respects the city itself thus resembles a huge marketplace,
in which virtually all urban land is exploited for private profit, very often
without formal approval.6 The only substantial park in the city was turned
into a cluster of restaurants targeted at the elite andmiddle class, and the only
children’s playground in the city centre was likewise sold off to a group of
former military personnel for development, in both cases without planning
permission (Goodfellow, 2013).
The Ugandan government in this period thus systematically allowed cer-
tain groups of people to build and work in ways that conflicted with formal
institutions, in exchange for political or economic support.7 There was,
however, another important political dimension to this, concerning decen-
tralization. In part because of the extensive number of factions that require
accommodating in Uganda, the government enthusiastically adopted the
5. Significant changes to urban governance in Kampala took place in 2011. While I allude to
the significance of these below, there is no space here to discuss the post-2011 situation in
more detail (see Gore and Muwanga, 2014).
6. Various interviews with planning officials in Kampala, 2009–10.
7. See Goodfellow (2013) for further detail.
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decentralization reforms being promoted by donors from the 1990s, as they
provided a new route to dispersed patronage (Lindemann, 2011). This en-
abled opposition figures to be elected to power in Kampala City Council,
bringing the struggle between the NRM and opposition forces to the city
level, which was reflected in the way that politicians on both sides sought
to buy the support of the city population through urban land-based side
payments, as a 2006 report into land leasing and sales in Kampala starkly
illustrated (RoU, 2006).
The situation in Kampala was thus a product of the NRM’s effort to main-
tain a political settlement in ways that were necessarily informal, because
they violated land-related regulations and required meddling in affairs that
had officially been decentralized to the city government. Yet it was also a
product of how factions excluded from the ruling coalition, but with signif-
icant holding power for historical or ethnic reasons, themselves attempted
to build and maintain support. In this respect, a national political settlement
that might in Khan’s terms be characterized as a ‘(weak) dominant party’
settlement starts to look more ‘competitive clientelist’ at the capital city
level. When bureaucrats or local politicians attempted to implement formal
institutions, other (usually national) politicians would routinely intervene to
‘protect’ urban groups from these efforts— ‘babysitting’ their various client
groups, in one interviewee’s words.8
Exploiting the city to maintain a political settlement in this way had
some negative consequences for the ruling NRM elite, and these became in-
creasingly evident over time. The widespread allocation of benefits through
informal channels, reflected in the virtual free-for-all in physical develop-
ment, not only resulted in a city so dysfunctional that even those in power
felt the negative effects, but also strengthened the opposition factions threat-
ening the regime’s dominance (Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013; Gore and
Muwanga, 2014). This led to a move in 2011 to radically reverse decentral-
ization and disempower powerful urban opposition factions by introducing a
new capital city authority directly accountable to central government (ibid.).
KIGALI: THE CITY-AS-EXPO
The basic contours of the national political settlement in Rwanda differ from
those in Uganda in some fundamental ways. A first important difference is
that what Khan terms ‘lower level factions’ within the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF)-led ruling coalition are weaker, and factions excluded from the
ruling coalition are also relatively weak (though this has started to change
in recent years). The trauma of genocide and outflow of certain opposition
forces, alongside legal restrictions on ethnic discourse and political activism,
8. Interview, 11 June 2014.
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all contribute to the relatively low level of holding power of groups outside
the ruling coalition (Reyntjens, 2013). As such, there is a much smaller range
of clients to whom it is necessary to allocate ‘side payments’. Moreover, the
dominance of the RPF is not built on a painstakingly constructed political
coalition of diverse groups, as was the case with the NRM when it achieved
power (Rubongoya, 2007), but rather on its military supremacy, delivery of
certain developmental results and suppression of opposition in a context of
just two major ethnic groups (Reyntjens, 2013).
The country ranks even lower than Uganda on questions of economic
transformation and productivity (ACET, 2014), and domestic capitalists are
generally lacking in capabilities, with the RPF itself constituting the main
entrepreneurial actor (Behuria, 2015; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). As
in Uganda, the vast majority of the urban population work in the informal
economy. However, they are not engaged in the same kinds of compet-
itive clientelistic relations with local government as in Kampala, in part
because there is no effective opposition and limited political decentraliza-
tion (Chemouni, 2014).
The relative absence of interests with substantial holding power outside
the ruling coalition, and the weakness of lower-level factions in the coalition,
has enabled the government to focus more thoroughly on economic growth
and the transformation of its economy (Behuria, 2015; Booth and Golooba
Mutebi, 2012). In Khan’s terms, the ruling coalition can therefore be charac-
terized as a ‘potential developmental’ one, because theweakness of excluded
factions minimizes the need for side payments and also enhances the gov-
ernment’s capacity to implement policy (Whitfield et al., 2015). However,
it still faces a situation where there is some demand for land-based side pay-
ments because powerful eliteswithin the coalition cannot easily enrich them-
selves through formal capitalist rights (which underpin many of Rwanda’s
donor-driven legal and policy frameworks) as there is little by way of a
capitalist economy through which to profit. Some of the ways in which this
dilemma is institutionally managed are illuminated quite vividly by studying
Kigali.
Kigali’s development since the turn of the millennium has been char-
acterized by remarkable strictness in regulatory enforcement. Developers
encroaching on green spaces often find their buildings demolished and per-
mission to build in such spaces is routinely refused; officials claim they have
not heard of anyone who succeeded in being granted permission to build
‘by appealing to high office’.9 Similarly, the situation with hotels is a direct
contrast to that in Kampala, with a spate of demolitions in the late 2000s
affecting hoteliers who had contravened planning regulations, or who simply
could not prove that they had complied with them.10 The comment made by
9. Interview, 10 February 2010.
10. Interview with District Mayor, 15 December 2009.
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one land policy advisor that ‘we are all impaled on the master plan’11 aptly
sums up the situation with respect to land use, zoning and other aspects of
urban development control. Commercial and residential real estate devel-
opments have been advancing, with entirely new areas of the city opened
up for suburban development and a series of towers in the old city centre
transforming its skyline. Very noticeably, however, there are certain central
areas that have been controversially cleared of slums since 2007 but without
much being put in their place, as they await the construction of a proposed
new central business district envisaged in the Singaporean-designed plans
(Goodfellow, 2014); unlike in Kampala, such plots have not been surrep-
titiously sold off and developed for profit. Another feature of the evolving
urban landscape has therefore been a number of ‘blank spaces’ in central
areas, on which nothing can currently be built due to the stringent zoning
regulations.
On the one hand, this apparent absence of widespread side payments in
the form of non-implementation of land laws and regulations comes as little
surprise, given the relatively few groups with relative power who require
informal material benefits. Yet our understanding of the political settlement
is deepened if we consider why even powerful elites are apparently unable
to easily circumvent land use regulations in their interests. Indeed, even the
wealthy and well-connected are sometimes forced to sell their land because
they cannot get around the regulations preventing them from using it as they
wish (interviews with investors, 2009 and 2014). Why do formal institutions
have greater force than in Kampala if they are not always closely aligned to
the existing distribution of power?
To understand this requires attention not only to power distribution but
to image management and the role that discipline and ‘zero tolerance’ to
corruption plays in RPF elite ideology and strategy (Behuria, 2016). Visible
enforcement of rules is part of a broader ‘performance’ (Rollason, 2013) to
present Rwanda as a developmental success, which the government consid-
ers crucial to the RPF mission. The city is consciously produced as a site
of secure, orderly and forward-looking development — the antithesis of the
1994 genocide—with a particular eye on international investment (Gatsinzi
and Donaldson, 2010; Goodfellow and Smith, 2013). Kigali’s landscape il-
lustrates that visible adherence to formal institutions is in its own right an
important aspect of the political settlement, irrespective of the fact that many
such institutions do not directly allocate benefits to the powerful. This dis-
play of rule-bound development is both inward facing, due to the potential
threats to power that might emerge if perceptions of corruption and disorder
among a regime based on an ethnic minority were to spread, and outward
facing. Kigali is, by the government’s own admission, where Rwanda is
most obviously on show to the world (interviews with government officials,
11. Interview, 19 February 2009.
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2010–11); the city is a sort of large-scale ‘expo’ for Rwanda’s develop-
ment. The perceived need to be seen doing things in accordance with formal
processes can also help explain the prevalence of ‘blank spaces’ noted previ-
ously. Architects working in the city note that rigid interpretation of planning
regulations causes long delays duringwhich nothing can be built.12 The blank
spaces reflect a government striving to minimize the degree to which formal
institutions are overridden with informal ones, a concern rooted in its ob-
session with image and made possible by the relative weakness of excluded
groups.
There is, however, another side to the institutional management of
Rwanda’s political settlement, which again manifests in Kigali. This is that
alongside some formal rules and regulations that constrain the allocation
of benefits to the powerful, there are others that clearly do help to allocate
benefits to powerful groups — or have the flexibility to do so. These play
an important role in holding the political settlement together. Strong legal
powers of expropriation, for example, allow for a very expansive definition
of ‘public interest’ through which land can legally be expropriated for profit
under certain conditions. Tax reforms have also been successfully resisted
by elites to facilitate maximum profits from real estate (Goodfellow, 2014).
Relatedly, the vesting of authority in a master plan that privileges high-rise
business development is generally well aligned with the interests of domes-
tic elites seeking profit; many lower-income groups are displaced as a result
(Manirakiza and Ansoms, 2014).
Moreover, some laws and regulations are easily changed without much
consultation (such as the property tax rate), and many are also unclear or
actively in flux, providing further opportunities for elites to profit without
actively breaking formal rules.13 For example, in 2012–15, zoning regula-
tions for a certain (currently undeveloped) part of the city were changed back
and forth five times over three years with little explanation, causing ongoing
delays for landowners wanting to build there. Some speculated that this was
an attempt to prevent this potentially lucrative area from being developed,
so that certain powerful actors could profit from it later on.14 This capacity
to change formal laws relatively easily can itself be seen as a form of ‘side
payment’, echoing Khan’s point that ‘[i]nformal power can also be used to
change formal laws to benefit groups who would otherwise not have bene-
fited’ (Khan, 2010: 54). In all, the political settlement thus involves balance
of formal institutions that directly serve the goal of rent accumulation by
elites and formal institutions that do not, privileging instead some other de-
velopment goal — including image management and the aversion to visible
corruption that are perceived as central to the governing elite’s survival.
12. Interview, 5 June 2014.
13. Various interviews, January 2015.
14. Interview, 12 January 2015.
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ADDIS ABABA: THE CITY-AS-CONSTRUCTION SITE
Ethiopia’s political trajectory bears considerable similarity to Rwanda’s in
terms of relatively tight and authoritarian control by a dominant party (Mat-
fess, 2015), but there are significant differences in the distribution of power.
This relates both to Ethiopia’s communist history and the complex ethnic cal-
culus of the Ethiopian polity. On coming to power in 1991 after years of civil
war, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) —
dominated by a group from the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia — was
a minority group within the country and attempted to deal with the ‘ethnic
question’ by instituting a system of ethnic federalism (Markakis, 2011). Ad-
dis Ababa is governed as a distinct multi-ethnic federal city, but the size and
complexity of the Ethiopian population, as well as the historical dominance
of the Amhara ethnic group, mean that the ‘holding power’ of a number
of excluded factions in the country and city is relatively strong. Like the
other two countries discussed here, Ethiopia falls in the category of political
settlements in which capitalists are relatively politically weak and lacking in
productive capabilities (Khan, 2010: 75), though this is arguably changing
(Oqubay, 2015). However, very significant in Ethiopia is the role of dias-
pora, who comprise an important group of investors (Lavers, 2012; Lefort,
2015) but one which is excluded from the ruling coalition. They cannot
invest in a number of economic sectors which are preserved for domestic or
state actors, and they are often hostile towards the ruling party.15
The communist legacy of the 1974–91Derg regime (including government
ownership of all land,which theEPRDFhas retained), alongside resistance to
some of the donor-sponsored liberalization reforms adopted wholeheartedly
in Uganda and Rwanda (Markakis, 2011; Lavers, 2012), provides the regime
with key formal institutional instruments to allocate benefits to relatively
powerful groups — particularly in relation to land. As will be explored
below, the evolving landscape of Addis Ababa provides insights into how
these instruments are used to maintain a political settlement, as well as when
and how recourse to more informal institutions is apparent.
One of the most striking features about Addis Ababa’s evolving form is
the scale and extent of construction, which dwarfs anything taking place
in Kampala or Kigali. Indeed, ‘[no] other capital city on the continent has
known such fast-paced and extensive modernization over the last few years’
(Lefort, 2015: 357). Notwithstanding considerable Chinese investment in
infrastructure, the proliferation of commercial and residential buildings is
primarily funded by Ethiopian investors — many of them diaspora, who ar-
rived in large numbers after the 2008 global financial crisis led to a flight from
investment in the global North— and by the state itself (Duroyaume, 2015).
In neighbourhoods such as Bole, Olympia and Mexico, towering frames of
15. Interview, 1 October 2014.
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half-built high-rise commercial structures line the (recently widened) main
roads. Estimates of how much money has been invested by diaspora into
real estate in the last few years range from US$ 1bn to over £ 3bn (Lefort,
2015: 368). In the eastern suburbs, meanwhile, newly-developed areas now
gaining connectivity to the centre through the new light railway network
are rapidly evolving residential real estate hubs. To the north and south
of these (and dotted around the edges of the city) are hulking blocks of
condominium apartments, part of the government’s innovative affordable
housing scheme which had produced 171,000 units in the city by early 2015
(allocated through a lottery and with some prioritized for low-income resi-
dents), while being both widely admired and criticized (Duroyaume, 2015;
UN-HABITAT, 2011).
Unlike Kigali, this construction is not especially regimented and there is
no current master plan in place, though a new one was being developed at
the time of research.16 Unlike Kampala, however, the state has a strong hand
in much construction, not only through the public housing programme —
which can be seen as partly a political project to ‘win over’ the growing
urban middle classes and aspiring lower classes17 — but through ownership
and control over land. Although government has retained land ownership, a
1993 law introduced new rules allowing land leasing and rental, influenced
by study trips in the 1990s to countries transitioning from socialism to
capitalism, including China.18 This opened the door for commercial urban
land development, leading to several modalities for allocating land leases.
In some cases prime plots are auctioned for as much as £ 3,250 per square
metre.19 Other modalities of allocation (for example through a modality
of ‘negotiation’, which accounted for most land leases from 2002–11) can
be opaque, as can the process by which land is made available for leasing
(Yusuf et al., 2009).
The leasing of land to commercial interests plays a particular role in
accommodating the profit-making desires of the diaspora, who are often
unable to invest in other key sectors.20 Indeed, this can be seen as part
of a political effort to neutralize the potentially destabilizing role of groups
hostile to the regime by allowing them to profit substantially from urban land
and real estate development (which most find to be much more profitable
than manufacturing) — especially as government exercises more restrictive
rules in a number of other sectors (Duroyaume, 2015; Lefort, 2015).
The city’s physical development sketched above illustrates how retaining
land control and channelling resources into social housing provide the gov-
ernment with significant scope to allocate benefits. This is necessary given
16. Interview, 30 September 2014.
17. Various interviews, September–October 2014. See also Planel and Bridonneau (2017).
18. Interview, 4 October 2014.
19. Interview, 29 September 2014.
20. Interviews, 30 September 2014.
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relatively strong excluded factions, and to a substantial degree facilitated by
formal institutions for land and housing delivery which differ from the more
heavily donor-influenced legal and policy frameworks evident in Uganda
and Rwanda. The condominium housing programme itself is a potent indi-
cation of the relative holding power of the urban masses in Addis Ababa,
who in 2005 resoundingly elected an opposition party to power in the city
(illustrating their much greater capacity to exert political damage than the
lower classes in Kigali), before the EPRDF tightened control and restricted
political freedoms to recapture the capital in 2010 (Di Nunzio, 2014). The
fear of urban upheaval is very apparent in Ethiopia (ibid.; Lavers, 2012),
and the city’s reshaping reflects the need for some material benefits to ac-
crue to the city population as a whole. While some of this happens through
formal channels and official government programmes, the city’s evolving
form also illustrates that excluded groups’ relative holding power makes it
more necessary than in Kigali to supplement formal mechanisms for allo-
cating benefits with informal side payments. For example, the widespread
belief that informal negotiation and corruption permeates the process of land
leasing (even after the abolition of the ‘official’ modality of negotiation in
2011),21 and the relatively haphazard nature of construction in the absence
of Rwandan-style strictness in planning and zoning (Duroyaume, 2015), are
testament to this.
In Addis Ababa there is thus a scramble for land in some respects akin
to that in Kampala, reflecting the wide range of interests that need accom-
modating. Yet the government retains a certain capacity to accommodate
these interests through its formal institutions, largely due to the ideological
legacy of public land ownership and restrictions on foreign investment. In
this respect, the political settlement does not rest so thoroughly on informal
competitive clientelism as in Uganda, yet it does require informal ‘supple-
ments’ to enable benefits to flow to all the requisite groups. Both the formal
and informal dimensions of this settlement have spatial effects, because in
the context of weak productive capabilities they depend on maximizing the
use of land to placate the range of interests vying for benefits in the city,
affording very little room for the ‘blank spaces’ of Kigali. The city thus
becomes a vast construction site where both formal and informal institutions
fully exploit the political value of urban land.
CONCLUSIONS
These three narratives aim both to illustrate the utility of a political settle-
ments approach for interpreting developments in the built environment, and
to demonstrate the value of studying urban form for understanding political
21. Various interviews with government officials and investors, September–October 2014.
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settlements. Capital cities such as those described above can be viewed as
spatial-physical manifestations of the interaction between power relations,
formal institutions and informal norms. The governing regimes in all three
countries are clientelist, and it is clear that they all rely to a significant ex-
tent on systems of patronage and the inconsistent application of laws and
rules. How institutions are used to maintain a political settlement varies
significantly between them, however. If Kampala represents a sort of modal
competitive clientelism, Kigali exhibits a structured, formalistic clientelism,
in which official rules must be visibly respected (and where necessary some-
times changed). In Addis, meanwhile, state control of key resources provides
additional formal instruments of clientelism distinct from those in the other
two cases. Studying urban form is a window onto these differences in clien-
telism because it is relatively easy to observe how land-based benefits are
distributed and whether this happens in accordance with formal rules or
not. Comparing transformations of urban space can therefore help to reveal
not only underlying differences in the distribution of power, but how these
combine with legacies of recent history (including ideological ones) to af-
fect the degree to which formal relative to informal institutions can be the
instruments through which the distribution of benefits takes place.
In linking transformations in the built environment (and sometimes stra-
tegically ‘unbuilt’ spaces) to benefit distribution through specific institu-
tional configurations, this approach develops an aspect of the political
settlements framework that is relatively underexplored in the literature.Most
existing literature on the framework focuses on the distribution of power it-
self, and how this relates to the relative power of productive entrepreneurs
and political factions. However, it is also important to consider how even
among clientelist political settlements in situations of late capitalist tran-
sition, the degree of dependence on informal institutions — and the way
formal ones are used— can vary widely. Moreover, particular combinations
of formal and informal institutions, predicated in part on historically spe-
cific distributions of power, themselves have particular developmental side
effects, including the spatial/physical ones that are the main focus here.
This article thus extends the political settlements framework into new
terrain in several ways: first, by empirically focusing on urban land and its
use as a site of accumulation and benefit allocation to maintain a political
settlement; second, by drawing attention to the different ways in which
clientelist settlements employ a balance of formal and informal institutions,
which is conditioned not only by power relations but ideational factors such
as developmental ideology and image management; and third, by exploring
some of the spatial effects of this.
In presenting this approach, the hope is to spur further comparative urban
research drawing on the political settlements approach. There are, however,
many issues to consider when taking this forward. One key problem is that
of scale. This article has aimed to situate national political settlements in
relation to the physical development of capital cities, exploring questions
Seeing Political Settlements through the City 21
about how the structure of power between different groups at the national
level affects institutional configurations at the city level. This is a deliber-
ate attempt to challenge both the tendency in some urban theory to treat
cities as sealed off from national dynamics, and the nation state fixation in
much political science and political economy. Nevertheless, there is need
for further theorization regarding how national and city-level institutions
interrelate, and the scale at which informal institutions are most appropri-
ately conceptualized and analysed. The question of whether and how such a
framework might be useful in smaller cities less core to national and political
life is important, as well as whether one can meaningfully talk of political
settlements at the city level rather than just interrelation between cities and
broader political settlements. The hope is that these ideas and the approach
outlined above will feed into research and theorization to further this agenda.
There are a number of other ways in which this research agenda could
be developed. While this article primarily explores the relationship between
political settlements and city form in one direction (how the specific nature
of the political settlement influences urban physical development), there is
also scope for examining the converse: how changes to urban physical en-
vironment shape the political settlement, for example through creating new
sources of power or affecting how institutions work. The potential of the
political settlements approach for studying different urban phenomena from
those discussed here — such as the nature of public goods provision or the
prevalence of violence and crime — could also be explored. Another issue
relates to the development of methodological tools for studying the relation-
ship between political settlements and change. As argued here, the ongoing
transformation of cities can be linked to relatively settled distributions of
power. Yet political settlements are themselves dynamic, subject to both
gradual change and critical junctures. There is therefore scope for exploring
how trajectories of urban transformation are affected by (and thus reflective
of) particular shifts and ruptures within an evolving political settlement.
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